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The Staffing of Presidential Assistants: Their Effect on 
Presidential Success in the House of Representatives
Nicholas Jesteadt
Abstract
This paper examines the Congressional success of United States Presidents 
based on the reported Congressional Quarterly Presidential Box Scores. Their 
individual success is examined as an effect of the senior staff member a President 
chooses and whether they are chosen from the campaign, personal experience, 
or previous administrations. It is important for a President to consider the 
origins of these staffers as these Assistants to the President act as the body of the 
President’s administration. The econometric analysis presented reveals several 
interesting results. First, the predominance of a President to choose staff members 
from his campaign shows no significant impact on his Congressional relations 
and success. Second, staff members chosen from personal experience have a 
negatively correlated hindrance on success. Finally, those members chosen for 
their experience in previous administrations has a positive impact on Presidential 
success. This research is used to supplement the existing, qualitative research on 
the subject through regression analysis.
I. Introduction
 At the beginning of every new Presidential administration, during the 
transition period, a President is faced with several critical choices, namely: what 
staff he should pick as his Assistants to the President. Assistants to the President 
are the senior staffers in the White House. They work with the President daily, 
they have offices in the White House, and they prepare advice sheets and 
recommendations for every policy that comes in the President’s door. He looks to 
them for those recommendations. There are also several that work with Congress, 
acting as a Liaison between the two and a defender of the President’s agenda. It 
is critical that the President picks the right people for the jobs because they could 
influence his success.
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 What are the right people for the job? Who should the President hire 
for those positions? The purpose of this paper is to determine if the types of staff 
members a President picks as his Assistants influence his success and secondly, 
what types of staff members provide a positive influence on that success.
 This paper aims to provide insight to future Presidents as they choose 
the people they want for the different Assistant positions. It also provides insight 
to political pundits as they evaluate the likely success of a President over his 
four or eight year term. Also, it provides a lens with which to evaluate the past 
performances and staff choices of Presidents. The findings of this paper may also 
be significant to gubernatorial success and local elections and perhaps even to 
other global governments in its determination of ideal staff member backgrounds.
 Previous literature has only just begun evaluating the factors that cause 
political success. Bond and Fleischer (1990) and Covington, et al (1995) are just 
a few of the papers that have begun exploring this topic. Their previous work 
laid the foundation for this paper to explore the possibility of Assistants to the 
President influencing presidential success, specifically in the legislative arena of 
the House of Representatives.
 In the next section, I will describe the previous literature on the topic, 
including papers that postulated and laid the framework for my study but did 
not provide any empirical background. Being that this is a novel study, I will 
also describe similar studies in the field of presidential legislative success and 
the variables they tested. In section three, I will present the entity-demeaned OLS 
equation being used to model this data and will discuss the relevant variables. In 
section four I will discuss and make observations about the data collected to test 
my hypothesis, and in section five, I will perform an empirical analysis of my 
hypothesis using the collected data to validate or negate previous literature that 
based their conclusions on assumptions. Finally, I will conclude and summarize 
my findings.
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II. Literature Review
This paper will attempt to add statistical evidence to the current theoretic 
literature on the effect of a President’s senior staff on the success of the administration. 
Most current papers on the topic are observational and base their conclusions on 
several assumptions. They do not justify their conclusions with any concrete data. In 
this paper, I will attempt to explain the success of a Presidential legislative success 
with the type of senior staff members in the administration.
For example, Carey examines Presidential staffing in the sixties and 
seventies and critiques the Johnson and Nixon administrations for their choices 
in senior officials – namely assistants to the President (1969). They suggest that 
more experienced staffers, who have engaged in the framework of staffing work, 
will better aid the President in completing his work. Carey’s paper does not 
specifically focus on Presidential “success” but he does comment on Presidential 
“effectiveness” and “efficiency.” Again, this paper is merely critical commentary 
and does not provide any statistical evidence.
Hoxie continued evaluating presidential staff choices for the Ford and 
Carter administrations, concluding that a President should select as his aides, men 
“whose goals and experience involve service to more than a single politician” 
(1980). Hoxie also concludes that “emotional dependency by a President” on his 
aides, “should be avoided as far as possible. The argument is that staff members 
with prior experience have a positive relationship with the success of a relationship 
and staff members with personal relationships to the President have a negative 
relationship. Hoxie’s paper adds no empirical support to these conclusions. The 
focus of this paper is to make “relationship” and “past experience” variables in the 
model evaluating presidential success.
King and Riddlesperger modernize this argument in their evaluation of 
the Clinton staffing choices (1996). They argue most definitively that a President’s 
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success in office is contingent upon the performance of the staffers he chooses for 
administrative positions. King and Riddlesperger also provide the last variable 
that this paper will test, staff that came from the campaign. Those involved on 
a Presidential campaign will often be given a job in the administrations; this is 
known as riding the President’s coattails. King mentions the prevalence of staffers 
from the campaign but does not argue their directional effect on presidential 
success.
As noted, the current literature on this topic does not provide any 
empirical data on the topic so this paper is novel. This paper will either add 
credence or help negate the previously mentioned work on this subject. It will be 
the statistical backing to their assumptions and conclusions.1
After I had researched the historical commentary on this issue, I reference 
past work on many closely related subjects to determine pertinent control 
variables for the model and help define the dependent variable. Only recently has 
the presidency been evaluated statistically: Bond and Fleischer (1990), Covington 
et al (1995), Durham et al (2003) all test various political variables on the success 
of the president. In these papers, roll call votes, compiled by Congressional 
Quarterly, are used as numerical indicators of Presidential success in Congress. 
Freund concedes that measuring Presidential success as the relationship between 
the President and Congress is only perspective of “success” (2004). However, for 
the purpose of this paper, that perspective will be used as the indicator of success.
Vital Statistics on the Presidency is a publication by Congressional 
Quarterly that documents the success rate of Presidents from Eisenhower to 
George W. Bush. The rate is measured as the number of bills that pass that a 
1  David E. Lewis wrote The Politics of Presidential Appointments (2008) that performs statistical 
analysis and regressions of staff characteristics on the success of Presidential administrations; 
however, it focuses on the bureaucracy, and not senior officials (Assistants to the President). While 
it was referenced for ideas, it was not heavily used in determining theory, model specification or 
past works.
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President supports in addition to the number of bills that fail that a President does 
not support divided by the total number of bills that the President takes a position 
on (2008). This paper will use those same figures.
Rivers and Rose conducted a probability study of individual bills 
supported by Presidential administrations, passing in the House of Representatives 
(1985). Using a sample of over 400 bills from 1954 to 1972, they tested for the 
effect of Presidential public opinion on the passing of presidentially backed bills. 
Their results suggest that popularity is barely significant at the 10% level. The 
study failed to control for the differing types of bills; they concluded that a bill on 
the economy is equal to a bill on foreign affairs. With such a specific dependent 
variable, that lack of clarity likely skewed their data.
Ostrom and Simon conducted a sample of Presidential legislative success 
yearly from 1953 to 1980 and found public approval to be statistically significant 
and positively correlated with success rates (1985). This much more exhaustive 
study controls for several more factors than Rivers and Rose and evaluates success 
overall rather than on individual bills. Ostrom and Simon provide public opinion 
as a control for this paper.
Edwards, Barrett and Peake had a sample of 638 pieces of “significant” 
legislation that failed to pass and evaluated that failure as a result of divided 
government (1997). Divided government had a t-statistic of 4.00 and was 
positively correlated with the failure of presidentially supported bills in Congress. 
This led them to conclude that the party controlling Congress is significant in 
determining the success rate of the President. 
This paper will add to the literature that has regressed different 
explanatory variables on legislative presidential success, while remaining 
completely unique on the explanatory variables being tested. Previous regressions 
will also be used as references for which to base control variables in this model 
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on. With the amount of literature being written on this subject already, this should 
be a powerful addition. Finally, the statistical findings of this paper will help to 
refute some of the generalized commentary on presidential staffing.
III. Modeling
The goal is to see if presidential legislative success is significantly affected 
by the type of staff members a President chooses as his Assistants. Specifically, 
those members that served in previous administrations should positively influence 
legislative success while those that worked on the campaign and have a personal 
relationship with the President should negatively influence legislative success.
This hypothesis will be modeled using an entity-demeaned OLS 
regression that averages the data for each administration from Gerald Ford to 
George W. Bush, differentiating between first and second terms. The reason 
is to eliminate any unobservable administration-specific – or term-specific – 
characteristics that pertain to their success in the House of Representatives. For 
example, Reagan may have had a better repertoire with members of the House of 
Representatives that led to higher success rates. By averaging each President’s 
success and deviating their individual successes from that mean, President specific 
variables should be accounted for. The estimated model is:
SucRate
t
 = β
0
 + β
1
*Approval
t
 + β
2
*Party
t
 + β
3
*Padmin
t
 + β
4
*Relate
t
 + 
β
5
*Campaign
t
 + e
t
    (1)
 
 The dependent variable is a President’s legislative success rate in the 
House of Representatives, measured annually. This variable, SucRatet, is a 
function of the bills that the President supported, that passed, and the bills that 
the President opposed, that did not pass. I control for the effects of presidential 
public approval and the majority party in the House of Representatives. 
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Presidential public approval, as referenced in Ostrom and Simon (1985), reflects 
the constituency’s support of the President’s agenda. The logic is that House 
Representatives should largely vote similar to their constituency. Therefore, the 
coefficient on Approval, β
1
 should be positive – the greater constituent approval, 
the greater the presidential influence in Congress. The effect of political party in 
the House of Representatives is a dummy variable that takes the value of “1” if the 
House majority is the same party as the President and “0” if the House majority 
is the opposite party of the President. As previously explained, if the House is the 
same political party as the President, the House will likely agree with and pass 
more of the President’s supported legislation. The coefficient on Party, β
2
 should 
be positive also.
 The variables measuring staff background – previous relationship to 
the President, previous administration positions, and campaign work – are more 
difficult to measure in the model. The Assistants to the President that also served 
in previous administrations, the variable Padmint, are measured as a percentage 
of the Assistants in any given year that have served under any previous President. 
Hoxie suggests that previous administrative experience will aid the success 
of the current President.2 As a result, the coefficient estimate on Padmin
t
, β
3
 is 
conjectured to be positive.
 The Assistants to the President that were notably chosen for their 
position because of their involvement in the Presidential campaign – either the 
initial or, when appropriate, re-election, denoted by the variable Campaign
t
, are 
measured as a percentage of the Assistants in any given year that were involved 
in that President’s campaign. However, while campaign mentality is productive 
and efficient in the eventual succession of the candidate to the Presidency, that 
mentality becomes an inhibitor. The campaign mentality is idealistic and different 
2 As noted above, Hoxie (1980).
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from the necessary productivity needed for legislative affairs and Congressional 
communications. Therefore, I posit that the coefficient estimate on Campaign
t
, β
4
 
will be negative.
 Finally, there are the Assistants to the President that have had a 
longstanding relationship with the President – likely a long term acquaintance or 
friendship – is measured by the variable Relate
t
. It is measured as the percentage of 
the Assistants that are chosen based on their personal affiliation with the President. 
While friendships are key to the successful President, long term friendships and 
personal relations could lead to bias in the President’s judgment. Again I speculate 
that the coefficient on Relate
t
, β
5
 is negative.
 In the data section I will explain the specific data sets used to describe 
presidential success rates and the control variables but I will now briefly explain 
how the characteristic variables were measured.
 The White House, every year, produces The White House Government 
Manual, which lists the Assistants to the President in the White House Office 
(WHO). A large portion of those Assistants have profiles in Who’s Who in 
American Politics, the autobiographies of the Presidents themselves, or in historic 
reports on the individual Presidents and their staff. Congressional Quarterly has 
been combining that data for their research guide to the evolution of the White 
House Staff from George Washington to Barack Obama. Fortunately, I have 
been part of that data collection. Every Assistant to the President listed in the 
Government Manual for each year can be demarcated as being from a previous 
administration (P), having a personal repertoire with the President (R), being 
selected from the campaign (C), or being from none of these categories (N). Once 
the total Assistants to the President have been tabulated and denoted with one or 
multiple of these tags, they were then converted into percent form. The labels – 
P, R or C – are then transformed into percentages of the total Assistants to the 
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President for every year.3 Those percentages were then used as the annual values 
to compare with the President’s legislative success rates.
IV. Data
 This paper focuses on the period from 1974 when the Ford Presidency 
began to 2008, the end of the Bush Presidency. CQ Press had compiled Presidential 
Success Scores during that time that serve as the data set reflecting the dependent 
variable in this study. Ideally, a variable would be created that composited several 
administrative factors into the category of “Presidential Success.” However, this 
paper is focusing solely on Presidential success in the legislative arena, particularly 
the House of Representatives. As mentioned, CQ compiles this data as the percentage 
of bills where the decision of Congress reflected the position of the President.4
 The control variables include presidential public approval ratings and 
whether the House of Representatives was the same political party as the President 
in any given year. Previously written, the party variable is a dummy variable. The 
public approval variable is an annual average of bi-weekly Gallup-Poll results on 
the popularity of the President. 
 The data set on the staffing variables was generated – mentioned above 
– from intensive research on the individual Assistants to the President and their 
connection (be it campaign, relationship, or previous administration) to the 
President. The amount of work that went into investigating the backgrounds 
of these individuals attests to the accuracy of the data set. Previous literature, 
including King and Riddlesperger (1996), has included variables such as 
“relationship to the President” but they use estimates of the percentage of staffers 
that are “friends” with the President over the course of their term rather than a 
year by year analysis of the men that served in the senior staffing level positions.
3 That is labeled “Table 1: Assistant to the President Labels” and is located in the Appendix.
4 That is labeled “Table 2: Presidential Success Scores in the House of Representatives” and is located 
in the Appendix.
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 Before describing the data, it is important to note that the Ford Presidency 
did not have any staffers from the campaign simply because Ford did not have 
a campaign. Once Nixon resigned, Ford assumed the role of the Presidency, 
with many of Nixon’s previous administration. He did not get to choose his own 
people. This could bias the data so a separate regression will be run excluding the 
data from 1974 through 1976 to see if any significant changes can be seen.
 Before I continue, it is significant to note that from 1974 to 2008, the 
number of Assistants to the President grew from 10 to 17 reaching record highs of 
27 during the Clinton administration. As the number of Assistants grows so does 
the number of people demanding the President’s attention and giving him advice. 
This could affect the receptiveness of the President and the number of Assistants 
that are actually influencing the President may be difficult to account for. It is the 
hope in this paper that by using the entity-demeaned OLS regression some of 
these unknown and uncontrollable factors will be reduced to a minimum so as to 
get the most accurate results.
Figure 1: Variable Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
SucRatet 35 55.19% 20.79 15.4% 87.3%
Approvalt 35 51.63% 11.69 26.0% 73.3%
Padmint 35 23.6% 24.3 0.0% 92.0%
Relatet 35 25.6% 16.2 0.0% 63.0%
Campaignt 35 44.5% 24.5 0.0% 100.0%
 Figure 1 depicts the summary statistics of the included variables except 
for Party
t
 because that is a dummy variable. The statistics provide insight into 
the evolution of staff through these recent administrations. In 1978, 100% of 
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the Assistants to the President came from the campaign. President Carter was 
dedicated to choosing those that had served him during the campaign. He was a 
strong advocate of rewarding his staff.
 In 1989, there was a 92% high of senior staff members that had come 
from past administrations. When George H.W. Bush won election, the Reagan era 
continued and he continued the previous administration with many of the same 
Assistant staff.
 It is also noteworthy that at different times throughout the time period in 
the study a President purged his staff of all those from a certain background. It is 
clear that as directives changed in each administration, the types of senior staffers 
were adjusted. Backgrounds were scrutinized and removed to help the President 
succeed and receive good advice.
 Interestingly, the legislative success rate of the President, on average for 
every administration, is around 50%. The President will typically succeed half of 
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Figure 2: Presidential Legislative Success Rates in the House of 
Representatives
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the time and fail half of the time. This observation demands the answer as to how 
a President can succeed more than 50% of the time. In fact, a successful President 
could be evaluated as one who is above that threshold while a weak President is 
evaluated as one below it.
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Figure 1: Staff % on campaign, relationship, previous 
administration over time 
 The success over time 
graph is also shown in Figure 2. 
During the first year it is typical 
that the President will have greater 
success than his later years because 
of the “Honeymoon” period that 
Congress grants him. Most of 
that fluctuation can be explained 
by the same political party as 
the President being in power 
during those years; however, it is 
noteworthy that the success rates 
of both Clinton and George W. 
Bush reached record heights in the 
early portion of their presidency as 
they both supported military fund 
allocations. 
 Figure 3 depicts the 
three staff measures against time. 
Past administration experience 
over time mirrors the graph of 
presidential success over time. 
Relationship to the president 
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seems to be the inverse to the graph of presidential success over time. Finally, 
campaign involvement also seems to inversely mirror presidential success, 
although not as definitively.
V. Empirical Evidence
 The table below shows the OLS regression results. Regression (1)5  was 
not entity-demeaned so that it could be compared to Regression (2) that is entity-
demeaned. The variation between the two regressions shows the necessity of using 
entity-demeaned OLS because it controls for administration specific variables.
Figure 4: OLS results for the legislative success of the President
  (1) (2)
Popularity .123 .024
  (0.69) (0.15)
Party  36.12 46.92
  (6.66)*** (8.35)***
Padmin  6.92 26.89
  (0.82) (2.04)**
Relate  15.80 11.12
  (1.01) (0.73)
Campaign -4.54 18.93
  (0.49) (1.62)
Entity Demeaned No Yes
Observations 35 35
Adj-R-squared 0.73 0.83
  
Durbin Watson Stat 1.81 2.28
Serial Correlation Possible Possible
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote level
of significance indicating 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
______________
5 This was my first regression performed; it was not until later that I realized I should account for 
administration specific variables by using entity-demeaned OLS. That is why it is included.
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 Both of these regressions included the data from 1974 to 1976 because 
I first noticed the possibility of serial correlation, being that this data set is a time 
trend. The Durbin-Watson statistic for both regressions falls within the uncertain 
region of the critical Durbin-Watson statistic values. This led me to evaluate the 
residuals against the lagged residuals (provided in Figure 5). Aside from a few 
outliers, there is an upward sloping pattern in the residuals. I attempted to correct 
for this serial correlation with a time trend and by weighting using the Prais-
Winsten method of Generalized Least Squared. However, the Durbin-Watson 
statistic remained in the uncertain region. 
 I corrected for the presence of autocorrelation using first differences 
– the variable minus the one period lag of that variable. Those results, entity-
demeaned, are provided in the table below. Regression (3) is the first difference 
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Figure 5: Residuals vs. Lagged Residuals, Regression (2)
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OLS including the 1974-1976 time period and Regression (4) is the first difference 
OLS excluding the 1974-1976 time period.
 Again, the serial correlation was removed in Regression (3) – see Figure 
7 – while it is still inconclusive as to the serial correlation in Regression (4). 
The Durbin-Watson statistic for Regression (3) is above the upper critical statistic 
while the statistic for Regression (4) is at the edge of the upper statistic.
 Looking at both regressions numbered (3) and (4) we see that the 
popularity coefficient, even differenced, remains statistically insignificant. 
We cannot reject the null hypothesis that β1 is zero at even the 10% level of 
significance. Also important to both regressions, the political party variable 
coefficient, β2, is statistically significant in difference from zero at the 1 percent 
level of significance. This significance was also seen in regressions numbered (1) 
and (2) even prior to the first differences.
Figure 2: OLS results (serial correlation corrected) for the legislative 
success of the President
1st Difference (3) (4)
Popularity .172
(0.70)
.186
(0.73)
Party 77.92
(7.19)***
77.86
(11.29)***
Padmin 8.25
(1.77)*
8.01
(1.95)*
Relate -8.58
(1.77)*
-9.54
(1.75)*
Campaign -7.47
(0.56)
-7.32
(0.41)
Entity Demeaned Yes Yes
Observations 29 27
Adj-R-squared 0.71 0.71
Durbin Watson stat 2.34 1.97
Serial Correlation No Possibly
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote level of significance indicating 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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 Focusing on Regression (3), we see that the coefficient on percentage 
of Assistants that served in previous administrations is statistically significant 
in difference from zero at the 10% level. As expected, the coefficient estimate 
is positive. As a President adds staff members with previous experience, their 
predicted legislative success is likely to rise. This makes sense because former 
administration officials have already experienced the White House. They know 
how it functions and how to perform best. Also, the coefficient on the percentage 
of Assistants with a previous relationship to the President is statistically significant 
in difference from zero at the ten percent level. Again, as expected by this paper’s 
hypothesis, the coefficient estimate is negative. As assumed, and argued by Hoxie, 
a relationship to the President deters that President’s success because they bias the 
President’s judgment. 
 In both Regression (3) and (4), the coefficient on the percentage of 
Assistants that originated from the campaign is not statistically significant in 
difference from zero. Multicollinearity between Campaign and Relate was tested 
but found to be minimal. It may just not be as important to determining presidential 
success as suggested by previous literature or my hypothesis. 
 Using Regression (4) without the 1974-1976 time period, there are a few 
slight differences. The coefficients on Party, Padmin, and Relate are largely to the 
same magnitude and have largely the same t-statistics.
 The Adjusted R-squared value in both is around 0.71 indicating that 
71% of the variation in presidential legislative success scores is explained by the 
variation in the included variables. The Probability>F value is also 0.000 for both 
regressions indicating that a relationship does exist and that the R-squared value 
is statistically significant in difference from zero.
 This paper’s hypothesis suggested that the type of Assistants a President 
picks for his senior staff influences his legislative success and that testable 
37
characteristics were Assistants from the campaign, from past administrations, and 
with personal connections to the President. The results have shown that Assistants 
to the President from past administrations and with relationships do matter while 
there is not enough evidence to suggest such a relationship in those from the 
campaign. Those from past administrations have a positive influence while those 
with personal connections have a negative influence.
VI. Conclusions
 The background of people chosen for Presidential Assistants is more 
than important to the later success of that President. This staffing influence can 
be witnessed historically and this paper has finally yielded empirical data on the 
subject. A great amount of literature exists on the topic but only insofar as it assumes 
conclusions without ever testing them. The reorganization of the Executive Office 
of the President under the Nixon administration led many political writers to 
examine the effect of staffers on the President’s administration. In the 1970s and 
1980s, the universal conclusion was that the President should choose staffers with 
prior experience while avoiding those people from the campaign and those with a 
close personal repertoire with the President. While those positions were logically 
argued, they were never empirically argued.
 This paper aimed to test that hypothesis and add reasonable credibility to 
the previous literature. Using the prior models of presidential success as a function 
of legislative success in roll call votes, this paper tested the effect of Assistants to 
the President on that success. The effect of Assistants to the President was tested 
using three different characteristics: the percentage of the staff in each year that 
came from the campaign, the percentage that had a personal relationship with 
the President, and the percentage that had worked in a previous administration. 
Controls were then added to account for presidential public approval and the 
majority party in the House of Representatives.
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 After correcting for autocorrelation in the time series and using entity-
demeaned OLS to account for the immeasurable differences brought by different 
administrations, I found that the type of staff chosen is significantly correlated 
with presidential legislative success. The percentage of staff that had experience 
from prior administrations is statistically significant and positively correlated. 
The percentage of staff that had a relationship with the President is statistically 
significant and negatively correlated. The percentage of the staff from the 
campaign is negatively correlated but the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
These results are aligned with the previous speculative literature and the control 
variables are aligned with previous studies on their respective influence.
 A further study could, as done by Rivers and Rose (1985), could examine 
the effect of staff on the passing of individual roll call bills in the same time 
period – 1974 to 2008 – to test their effects. This paper performed a regression on 
the annual averages of public approval and staff percentages but individual bills 
could be regressed in a snapshot of time, so as to confound the results with annual 
averages. This study could also test for the differences of Assistant influence for 
different bills – be it domestic, economic or foreign affairs. By differentiating 
presidential legislative success into those three categories, we could get a much 
more specific depiction of Assistant influence.
 This paper’s findings are significant for media pundits, political advisors 
and Presidents in the choosing of their staff. While a President may want to choose 
those from the campaign or personal friends, this research suggests that they could 
be a detriment to his legislative agenda. A President should look for experience. On 
the same token, pundits and advisors can evaluate a President based on the staff he 
has chosen and be able to cite these findings as evidence rather than using the mere 
speculation of the past literature. Of course, this study alone should not be the only 
criterion that a President uses. This statistical evaluation should just another tool.
39
References
Carey, William. 1969. “Presidential Staffing in the Sixties and Seventies.” Public Administration 
Review 29 (5):450.
Covington, Cary, and J. Mark Wrighton. 1995. “A “Presidency-Augmented” Model of Presidential 
Success on House Roll Call Votes.” American Journal of Political Science 39 (4):1001. 
Durham, Brandy, Jeffrey Cohen, Richard Fleisher, and Jon Bond. 2003. “The Effects of State Level 
Presidential Approval on Support in the Senate.” Midwest Political Science Association. 
Edwards III, George, Andrew Barrett, and Jeffrey Peake. 1997. “The Legislative Impact of Divided 
Government.” American Journal of Political Science 41 (2):545. 
Freund, Elizabeth. 2004. “Presidential Success in Foreign and Domestic Policy Areas.” Department 
of Government and Politics, University of Maryland.
Hoxie, Gordon. 1980. “Staffing the Ford and Carter Presidencies.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 10 
(3):378. 
King, James, and James Riddlesperger. 1996. “Presidential Management and Staffing: An Early 
Assessment of the Clinton Presidency.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 26 (2):496. 
Lewis, David. 2008. The politics of presidential appointments: Political control and bureaucratic 
performance, Anonymous Anonymous . New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Ostrom, Charles, and Dennis Simon. 1985. “Promise and Performance: A Dynamic Model of 
Presidential Popularity.” The American Political Science Review 79 (2):334. 
Ragsdale, Lyn. 2008. Vital statistics on the presidency, Anonymous Anonymous . Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly Inc. 
Rivers, Douglas, and Nancy Rose. 1985. “Passing the President’s Program: Public Opinion and 
Presidential Influence in Congress.” American Journal of Political Science 29 (2):183. 
The United States Government. 1974-2008. The United States Government Manual. Washington D.C. 
40
Appendix
Table 1: Assistant to the President Labels
Year P (% P) R (% R) C (% C) Total Assistants
1974 5 (50) 3 (30) 0 (0) 10
1975 2 (22) 3 (33) 0 (0) 9
1976 0 (0) 2 (22) 0 (0) 9
1977 2 (25) 5 (63) 7 (88) 8
1978 1 (11) 5 (55) 9 (100) 9
1979 1 (10) 4 (40) 9 (90) 10
1980 1 (11) 4 (44) 6 (67) 9
1981 7 (54) 2 (15) 10 (77) 13
1982 3 (20) 6 (40) 8 (53) 15
1983 3 (18) 6 (35) 6 (35) 17
1984 4 (25) 4 (25) 6 (38) 16
1985 5 (55) 2 (22) 3 (33) 9
1986 4 (33) 0 (0) 3 (25) 12
1987 2 (15) 0 (0) 3 (23) 13
1988 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (21) 21
1989 12 (92) 2 (15) 2 (15) 13
1990 12 (86) 3 (21) 3 (21) 14
1991 11 (73) 3 (20) 3 (20) 15
1992 9 (56) 1 (06) 5 (75) 16
1993 1 (08) 4 (33) 7 (58) 12
1994 2 (09) 6 (26) 13 (57) 23
1995 2 (08) 5 (20) 12 (48) 25
1996 2 (09) 6 (26) 9 (39) 23
1997 0 (0) 6 (23) 15 (58) 26
1998 0 (0) 7 (27) 16 (62) 26
1999 0 (0) 4 (15) 12 (44) 27
2000 0 (0) 4 (16) 12 (48) 25
2001 3 (18) 10 (59) 8 (47) 17
2002 3 (18) 7 (41) 10 (59) 17
2003 3 (23) 5 (38) 6 (46) 13
2004 3 (21) 6 (43) 6 (43) 14
2005 2 (13) 3 (19) 7 (44) 16
2006 2 (13) 2 (13) 7 (44) 16
2007 3 (18) 2 (12) 7 (41) 17
2008 2 (12) 0 (0) 6 (35) 17
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Table 2: Presidential Success Scores in the House of Representatives
Year SucRate
1974
59.3
1975
50.6
1976
43.1
1977
74.7
1978
69.6
1979
71.7
1980
76.9
1981
72.4
1982
55.8
1983
47.6
1984
52.2
1985
45
1986
33.3
1987
33.3
1988
32.7
1989
50
1990
32.4
1991
43.2
1992
37.1
1993
87.3
1994
87.2
1995
26.3
1996
53.2
1997
38.7
1998
36.6
1999
35.4
2000
49.3
2001
83.7
2002
82.5
2003
87.3
2004
70.6
2005
78.3
2006
85
2007
15.4
2008
33.8
